




































zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
IZA Policy Paper No. 8
Importing a Successful System?
Simulating Different Regimes of Financing




Importing a Successful System? 
Simulating Different Regimes of 




EWI, University of Cologne  
 
Andreas Peichl 
















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  













The IZA Policy Paper Series publishes work by IZA staff and network members with immediate 
relevance for policymakers. Any opinions and views on policy expressed are those of the author(s) 
and not necessarily those of IZA. 
 
The papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of 
such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly 






Importing a Successful System? Simulating Different 
Regimes of Financing Social Security for Germany
*
 
In Germany, there is an ongoing debate about how to increase the efficiency of the social 
security system. The aim of this paper is to simulate different financing systems for Germany 
with its typical Conservative welfare state regime. For our analysis, we rely on the European 
static multinational microsimulation model EUROMOD, which provides the opportunity to 
implement the financing systems of other European countries in Germany (policy swap). The 
introduction of a Liberal British or the Southern Greek financing system increases inequality 
and poverty, as well as labour supply incentives. The introduction of the Social-democratic 
Danish financing system decreases inequality of incomes and leads to ambiguous incentives 
effects. Our results suggest that there is scope for efficiency increasing reforms in Germany 
although we do not simulate behavioural responses. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  C81, D31, H24 
  





Andreas Peichl  
IZA 
P.O. Box 7240 
53072 Bonn 
Germany 
E-mail: peichl@iza.org       
 
                
 
                                                 
* This paper uses EUROMOD version C13. EUROMOD is continually being improved and updated 
and the results presented here represent the best available at the time of writing. EUROMOD relies on 
micro-data from twelve different sources for fifteen countries. This paper uses data from the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) User Data Base made available by Eurostat; the public use 
version of the German Socio Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) made available by the German Institute 
for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin; the Greek Household Budget Survey by the National Statistical 
Service of Greece; and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), made available by the UK O
ce for National Statistics (ONS) through the Data Archive. Material from the FES is Crown Copyright 
and is used by permission. Neither the ONS nor the Data Archive bears any responsibility for the 
analysis or interpretation of the data reported here. An equivalent disclaimer applies for all other data 
sources and their respective providers. This paper is based on work carried out during a visit to the 
European Centre for Analysis in the Social Sciences (ECASS) at the Institute for Social and Economic 
Research (ISER), University of Essex, supported by the Access to Research Infrastructures action 
under the EU Improving Human Potential Programme. We are grateful for financial support by the Fritz 
Thyssen foundation. We would like to thank Clemens Fuest, Judith Niehues, Thilo Schaefer and 
Sebastian Siegloch for helpful comments and suggestions. We are indebted to all past and current 
members of the EUROMOD consortium for the construction and development of EUROMOD. 
However, any errors and the views expressed in this paper are the authors' responsibility. In particular, 
the paper does not represent the views of the institutions to which the authors are affiliated. 1 Introduction
"Reforming Social Security to restore its nancial balance is one of the most important public
policy issues of the 21st century" (Clark (2004), p. 182). This is not only true for the US but
almost every developed country as well. For instance, in Germany, there is an ongoing debate
about how to increase the eciency of the social security system and especially its nancing.
It is argued that due to the open European markets a lot of downward pressure weighs on the
social security system, which leads to a race to the bottom. The German economist Hans-
Werner Sinn noted in an interview with the German newspaper 'Die Zeit'1 that more nancial
means are needed for redistribution in order to compensate the losers of globalisation. Further
on, demographic change will put additional pressure on the social security system over the
next years (see also Sinn (2000)). A decreasing number of contributors will have to nance
an increasing number of benet recipients. Demographically induced labor shortages could be
aggravated by the negative work incentives inherent in higher social security contributions. But
on the other hand, it is getting more and more dicult to raise public funds. Some argue that
more privatisation of the social insurance system is necessary to make the system nancially
viable. They refer to the economic growth and high labour market participation in Anglo-
Saxon countries to point out the success of privatisation. Others argue that the nancing of
the welfare state is not a matter of nancing per se but of the nancing structure, pointing out
that the Scandinavian countries with much higher tax burdens also display high growth rates,
low unemployment and additionally less inequality of incomes (see Becker (2007)).
In this context, Germany's nancing system of social security is often compared to other
welfare state systems and their nancing structures. Concerning the comparison of welfare
state systems, there are four types mentioned in the literature for the EU15 countries (see,
e.g., Arts and Gelissen (2002)): the Conservative model based on social-contributions, the
tax-nanced Social-democratic welfare states with extensive public social security systems,
the Liberal market-based model and the Southern model. Comparing the German nancing
structure to the Scandinavian or to the British system, the argument arises that too much costs
on labour are caused by social contributions, which increases unemployment. Apparently, the
German system of nancing welfare has many disadvantages. The Harvard economist Stefan
Collignon even claimed in the above-mentioned article of 'Die Zeit' that the Conservative model
of welfare provision has failed. It seems as if Germany's European neighbours manage to
nance their social insurance systems much better than the Germans and that a lot of progress
is necessary to make the welfare state nancially viable. Predominantly, these topics and the
comparison of dierent nancing structures are analysed on the macro-economic level, but what
1 Cf. Rudzio and Uchatius (2005).
1is happening on the micro-economic level?
In this paper, we analyse the micro-level eects of implementing three representative proto-
types of dierent welfare state regimes in Germany. With its socio-economic and demographic
structure, Germany - Europe's largest economy - can be seen as a typical Western European
democracy. Therefore, the qualitative results of our analysis are of interest to a wider range of
countries.2 To the best of our knowledge, this has not been analysed before in the literature.
Thogersen (2001) simulates the intergenerational welfare eects of alternative funding strategies
for Norway. Galasso and Profeta (2004) simulate the political sustainability of social security
systems in 6 OECD countries with population ageing. Immervoll et al. (2007) use the European
multinational microsimulation model EUROMOD to analyse the eects of introducing in-work
benets in 15 EU countries. For our analysis, we also rely on EUROMOD, which provides
the opportunity to implement the nancing systems of other European countries in Germany
(policy swap). In doing so, the following questions will be raised: How are the income tax
burden and the social contributions payments distributed between dierent households? What
are the eects on inequality and poverty of dierent nancing structures? How does the nan-
cing structure aect the labour costs and the work incentives of dierent households? In this
context, does the German welfare state manage to keep up with its European neighbours? Our
results suggest that the Conservative German social security regime is quite successful with
respect to equity targets but in terms of work incentives there is scope for eciency gains.
The outline is as follows: In section 2, the nancing structure of the respective welfare states
is displayed as well as the detailed nancing systems of each respresentative country of the four
clusters. Section 3 starts with an introduction to the microsimulation model EUROMOD and
the methodology used for the calculations that follow. The substitution of the German nancing
system by the systems of the other three representative countries of the previous section, namely
Denmark, the United Kingdom and Greece, is simulated in section 4. Subsequently, the eects
of these simulations on the income distribution, on labour costs and on labour supply incentives
are summarised. Section 5 concludes.
2 Financing Systems in Europe
Arts and Gelissen (2002) present an overview of the literature on welfare state regimes following
the seminal publication of Esping-Andersen (1990). In comparison to Esping-Andersen (1990)'s
holistic point of view on a welfare state, this section will follow Kasza (2002)'s advice to focus
on a specic domain of the welfare state to compare the welfare state systems, which will be
2It has to be taken into account, though, that the structures of the tax benet systems do vary considerably
among the countries of Western Europe.
2the nancing structure. This section will present the design, structure and relevance of social
contributions and income taxation in the four welfare state clusters and it will present these
aspects in four representative countries to give a more detailed example and to introduce the
parts of the nancing systems that will be simulated for Germany later on. The main features
of the four welfare state clusters are summarised in table 1
Conservative Social-democratic Liberal Southern
Level of Income Taxes Intermediate High Low Low/ Intermediate
Level of Social Contributions High Intermediate/ Low Low Intermediate
Main Financial Source of Public Social Insurance Contributions Taxes Taxes Contributions
Degree of Privatisation of Social Insurance Intermediate Low High Intermediate
Table 1: Financing of Social Insurance in Europe
The nancing objectives of a welfare state are miscellaneous and can have dierent functions
such as distribution, allocation or stabilisation, whereas the ranking of the importance of these
functions depends on the society's preferences as well as the main sources of public funds
(Musgrave and Musgrave (1989)). There are dierent means to nance a welfare state such as
direct and indirect taxes, social insurance contributions or fees and charges. Some tax breaks
or allowances are similar to transfers to the aected tax unit. Thus these instruments have
a social expenditure function and an in
uence on the resulting income distribution, especially
when considering tax reforms. The way of nance and the balance between dierent nancing
instruments reveal who pays for welfare and, concerning the social security system, also how
welfare is distributed.
Bonoli (1997) focused on the nancing structure of welfare states and clustered the countries
according to the level of social protection expenditure and the importance of social contributions
in the nancing mix. The resulting Bonoli-matrix, as shown in gure 2, considers, on the one
hand, the level of welfare provided and, on the other hand, the nancing structure of the welfare
system.
The four clusters of welfare states can be dierentiated in this manner: the Nordic cluster
with a high level of welfare provision in terms of social expenditure and a low percentage of
social expenditure nanced through contributions, the Conservative countries featuring a high
percentage of social contributions and a high percentage of social expenditure, the Liberal
cluster with low percentages for both dimensions and nally the Southern countries exhibiting
a high level of social contributions like the Conservative countries, but a low level of social
expenditure ascribed to their rudimentary state in the previous section.
Concerning the nancing structure, the dierent countries within each type of welfare state
have a lot of characteristics in common, but it is dicult to build an ideal-type for each



















































Source: Own calculation using data from Eurostat and OECD for 2003.
whose nancial structure are noticeably dierent from the German one. Denmark, the UK and
Greece have been chosen, because they display comparatively large distances from the German
nancing system in the Bonoli-matrix.3 Denmark with its large proportion of tax nancing
is outstanding. The UK represents the typical Liberal European welfare state and Greece
is chosen because it is less developed than other Southern European welfare states, and thus
represents a more rudimentary welfare state. This might seem to be a very simplied approach,
but the aim of the simulation will not be to make general assumptions about the establishment
of a dierent welfare system in Germany, but to see some tendencies and eects of changes in
the nancing system, which are derived from the respective countries and thus another welfare
state type.
2.1 The Conservative Model of Financing
The Conservative welfare states provide a high level of public support and are relying especially
on compulsory contributions to nance social security (Bismarckian idea). These contributions
are paid to governmental institutions, which provide social security benets, and can be either
a xed amount or a percentage of the wages. Employers usually also have to pay additional
percentages to the contributions of employees.The entitlements for social insurance benets
3Ireland could have been chosen instead of the UK, but since it is often argued that Ireland is just a lacked-
behind-system, and since the UK are always considered as the main representative of the Liberal welfare states
in Europe, the UK seemed to be more adequate.
4are mainly conditional on the contribution record and on employment. The insurance funds
are often augmented by government transfers from the budget. In the European context, the
Conservative states are characterised by an intermediate tax burden. The total tax revenue in
per cent of GDP in these countries is close to the EU average of about 40%.4
The German Income Tax: In Germany, the taxable income includes salaries, wages,
self-employment income, investment income, rental income, income from farming and forestry
and other income sources. The German income tax system is a progressive system with rates
ranging from 19.9% to 48.5% in 2003. 7,235 e per year are tax-exempt in 2003. The tax
schedule is formula-based.5 The income tax liability for married couples holds marital status
tax relieves which are considered when applying the income splitting method.6 There is a child
tax allowance of 3,648 e per child in 2003. Expenses that have been made to obtain the taxable
income are deductible. This includes all the expenses that are necessary to earn and maintain
the taxable income. In addition, some special expenses are deductible, including church tax, tax
consultant's fees and interest payments as well as regular payments to dependants, education
costs or donations. Further on, all expenses incurred in provision for the future, i.e. social
insurance contributions or expenses such as for life insurances, are partially deductible from
the tax base up to a certain ceiling.
Social Contributions in Germany: Unemployment benets, health insurance, long-
term-care benets, disability benets, old age pensions, and survivor benets are nanced
through compulsory contributions which are paid half by the employer and half by the em-
ployee. The amount of total social security contributions is limited by a monthly or annual
ceiling. Earnings that exceed this ceiling remain free of social contributions, which yields a re-
gressive distribution of the burden (Peichl and Schaefer (2008)). The average health insurance
contributions rates in 2005 amounted 13.3% and the annual ceiling for these contributions was
42,750 e. In addition, the social security system is subsidised by the Federal Budget. In case
of employment injuries or occupational diseases, nancial support is paid by employer's contri-
butions. Family allowances are nanced through taxation. Contributions at a rate of 19.5%
to pensions and disability and 6.5 per cent to unemployment insurance are compulsory for an
income above 400 e per month. The contribution ceiling is set at the upper earnings threshold
of 3,850 e for East and 4,600 e for West Germany per month. Under certain conditions,
self-employed can opt out of the compulsory social insurance system.
4Cf. European Commission (2007).
5For a denition of the formula to determine the tax liability, see OECD (2007), p. 229.
6The splitting method allows the following: To determine the tax liability of jointly assessed spouses, the
income tax is calculated according to half of the joint taxable income and then it is doubled.
52.2 The Social-Democratic Model of Financing
The Bonoli-matrix re
ected the high level of social expenditure as percentage of GDP in the
Scandinavian countries, which presumes a high level of nancing. In 2005, Denmark and
Sweden featured the highest shares of total tax revenue including social contributions in per
cent of GDP in the EU. Denmark having a share of 50.3% and Sweden featuring 51.3%, these
two countries were the only ones exceeding a share of 50%. The universal welfare states of
the Scandinavian countries are mainly nanced by general taxes in order to secure a minimum
protection irrespective of a person's participation in the labour market. They do not only
exhibit the most elevated overall tax ratios but also show the highest personal income tax
rates.7 Denmark had a top rate of 59% in 2006. Sweden followed with 56.6%. Finland's top
statutory personal income tax rate was 50.9%. The Danish tax structure stands out in several
respects. In particular, the heavy reliance on direct income taxation in nancing the public
sector, while social contributions play a minor role, is incisive.
The Danish Income Tax: The taxable income is the sum of personal and capital incomes
such as wages, company prots, benets, pensions, allowances, and capital income. Contribu-
tions to private insurances are deductible to give people an incentive to accumulate savings.
Income is taxed on an individual basis, however, spouses can transfer unused allowances to
the partner. There are three taxation levels: the state, the county and the municipality level.
Low income earners only pay municipal taxes and bottom-bracket tax to the state, those with
slightly higher incomes additionally pay the middle-bracket tax, and those with the highest
incomes additionally pay the top-bracket tax on the upper part of their income. The local tax
rates are dierent across municipalities and counties. The average local tax rate in 2001 of
33.2% included a church tax of 0.7 per cent. State taxes are paid on income that exceeds the
respective tax allowance. There are three income brackets. In 2001 income from 4,486.59 e to
23,897.13 e is taxed at 6.25%, income from 23,897.13 to 37,195.69 e is taxed at additionally
6% and income above 37,195.69 e is taxed at 15% on top. In addition, income from shares,
i.e. yield and prots, which have been held since at least three years, is taxed at a rate of 25%
for an income up to 5,171.67 e and at a rate of 43% above this amount. An unused threshold
can also be transferred between partners. The taxation ceiling without church tax and taxes
on income from shares is 59%.
Social Contributions in Denmark: There are two types of contributions, i.e. most
importantly the general contributions from the insured employees and self-employed at a level
of 8% of the salary or the gross earnings. In addition, employers pay 2%. Second, there are the
contributions for special pension savings paid to the special saving scheme. The contribution
7Not being implemented in EUROMOD, indirect taxation is neglected in this paper, although it plays a
major role in the nancing structure of most European countries, especially in the Scandinavian countries.
6for the supplementary pension scheme paid by employees depends on the hours worked. For
less than 9 hours of work per week no contributions are paid. For a full time work with at least
27 hours per week the contribution was 120.09 e for the year.8
2.3 The Liberal Model of Financing
Returning to the Bonoli-matrix, the residual character of the nancing structure of the Liberal
welfare states is shown by the low level of social expenditure in a Europe-wide comparison.
The UK and Ireland are relying more on income taxation than on social contributions and
they display low tax wedges between total labour costs to the employer and the corresponding
net take-home pay at average earnings levels.9 The total tax revenue of the UK for 2005 of
37% falls slightly below the GDP-weighted EU average, whereas the Irish total tax revenue
is much lower at 30.8% in the respective year.10 The Liberal tax schedules are simplied and
transparent with a broad tax base and comparatively low tax rates on average. Concerning the
top statutory personal income tax rate, the UK (40%) and Ireland (42%) are situated below
the average EU-15 level but above the EU-25 average.
The Income Tax in the UK: The income tax system in the UK is an individual system.
For married couples, each spouse is taxed independently. The personal allowance was 4,615
pounds (6,632 e) per year in 2003. For people aged over 65, the personal allowances is higher
(6,610 pounds or 9,499 e in 2003) and even higher for those above the age of 75 (6,720 pounds
or 9,657 e in 2003). The tax system is characterised by a comparatively broad base. Taxable
income includes earnings from employment, earnings from self-employment, most pension in-
come, i.e. state, company and personal pensions, interest on most savings, income from shares
(dividends), rental income and income paid from a trust. The tax schedule is unied and thus
practical. It consists of three rate bands with the rates 10%, 22% and 40%.
The Working Tax Credit (WTC) and the Child Tax Credit (CTC) are part of the British
tax system, although they have the characteristics of benets. The WTC is a tax credit for
singles or couples who are employed or self-employed and work at least 16 hours per week. The
WTC consists of several elements: A basic adult element of 2,191.51 e and extra elements
which are paid e.g. if one household member works a total of 30 hours or more a week or for
childcare. If a person qualies for the child care element of WTC, this will always be paid
alongside payments of CTC.
Social Contributions in the UK: In the UK there are overall contributions paid for
dierent social insurances. These contributions are a nancial source comprehensively for si-
8For 9 to 18 hours 1/3 of 120.09 e and for 18 to 27 hours per week 2/3 of this amount have to paid.
9Cf. OECD (2007), pp. 11-14.
10Cf. European Commission (2007), p. 4.
7ckness and maternity, invalidity, old-age, survivors, and unemployment benets. However,
sickness and maternity are to a larger extent nanced by taxation. Employment injuries and
occupational diseases as well as family allowances are completely nanced through taxes and
also the unemployment insurance has additionally sources established by tax nancing.11 Social
contributions in the UK, namely National Insurance contributions, consist of four classes. Class
1 contributions are payable by employees earning more than 89 pounds, i.e. 127.9 e per week
in 2003. Self-employed are subject to Class 2 and class 4 contributions which only entitle to
basic retirement pension but not to short-term benets. The ceiling of 3,664.4 e per month for
individuals that have to pay both self-employment and employment contributions is the same
as for the employees. The classes dierentiate between individuals that are contracted-out, i.e.
who are privately insured, and those who are not. The Class 1 contribution rate is set at 11%
if contracted-in plus 12.8% paid by the employers and at 9.4% plus 9.3% employer contribu-
tions if contracted out. Self-employed that are subject to Class 2 contributions pay 8%. Class
3 contributions are paid on a voluntary base mainly by persons living abroad to keep their
contribution record.
2.4 The Southern Model of Financing
Referring to the Bonoli-matrix , it can simplistically be said that the Southern model of nan-
cing is characterised by a comparatively low level of social expenditure mainly nanced in the
Bismarckian way through social contributions. Thus, the nancial sources needed to nance
the expenditures are also lower than in other European countries, which is displayed by lower
tax and contribution payments.
The Greek Income Taxation: In the Greek income tax system, the tax unit is the
individual, and the spouse's income is taxed separately. However, there are some exceptions,
i.e. several allowances and tax credits that are jointly assessed on the basis of a broader tax unit
including the married couple and the dependent children. Social contributions are exempted
from the tax base which covers taxable income minus various tax allowances. The tax schedule
is graduated and progressive, including three tax bands with lower limits of 8,400 e, 13,400 e
and 23,400 e. The respective tax rates are 15, 30 and 40%. Additionally, the upper limit of
the rst tax bracket could be extended by 1600 e maximum for tax payers with income from
employment earnings and retirement benets. As mentioned before, the Greek tax system
comprises a number of tax credits and tax allowances, e.g., for charitable donations and private
insurance payments, and a child allowance depending on the number of children.
Social Contributions in Greece: In Greece, social insurance programmes are mainly
11Cf. European Commission (2006b).
8funded by employees' and employers' contributions. Since 1993, some social insurance funds
receive additional state subsidies and social sources.12 All individuals have to be members of a
social security organisation. The majority of employees and workers in the private sector are
directly and compulsorily insured with IKA.13 All members of IKA are subject to contributions
at a 
at rate of 15.9% of their wages. In addition, employers pay 27.66% of these earnings.
For 'hazardous' workers, i.e. blue-collar workers who have to do heavy, unhealthy or dangerous
work, extra contributions at 3.45% of the workers' earnings are due, plus 2.15% paid by the
employer, because these workers are entitled to a pension ve years earlier. Civil servants and
other public sector workers are covered by a separate scheme. Their contributions are set at a

at rate of 16.22%. Pensioners have to pay a 
at rate of 4% for sickness insurance.14
Self-employed are covered by TEBE and are subject to lump-sum contributions depending
on the insurance class. In TEBE there are ten insurance classes that are applied for individuals
rst employed before 1993 and there are additional ve classes for later entrants to the labour
market, all according to the pre-estimated self-employment income. For all individuals active in
agriculture or in related sectors such as shing that are residents in rural areas, a membership
in the agricultural social insurance organisation OGA is compulsory. The OGA scheme is
applied to employees and self-employed. Contributions are set according to seven dierent
levels of theoretical income. The amount of contributions for the dierent classes was dened
at about 8.5 of theoretical income, which included 7% for pension insurance and 1.5% for
sickness insurance. Since contributors could choose their insurance class themselves, more than
75% were in the rst category in 2003.15
To sum up some aspects of this section, gure 2 displays the taxes, employee social contri-
butions and benets that would lead to a disposable income of 100 e in the four countries that
have been presented in detail. Concerning the quantity of welfare that is provided and the
amounts that are levied from the original income, Denmark is in front, followed by Germany
and then Greece. The nancing structure of Germany and Greece is characterised by a large
proportion of social contribution payments. Contrarily, the system of the UK and Denmark
rely more on income taxation.
12The state gives subsidies to the social insurance institutions to nance sickness and maternity, invalidity,
old-age benets, benets for survivors and benets paid for persons being aected by employment injuries or
occupational diseases.
13IKA is the largest Social Insurance Organisation in Greece and covers about 5.5 million employees.
14Cf. European Commission (2006a) and Matsaganis and Tsakloglou (2004) and OECD (2007).













Figure 2: Composition of 100 e Disposable Income, Average
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD C13.
3 Data and Methodology
EUROMOD is a static tax-benet microsimulation model covering the EU15 countries. The
model can be used for a wide range of applications, such as the exploration of the eects of
dierent prospective or hypothetical changes in social and scal policy on the income distribu-
tion and on labour incentives. One of the main ideas of EUROMOD is the comparability of the
eects of social policies across nations within a common framework. However, there are some
shortcomings: The model is static. Therefore it does not allow for the computation of dynamic
or long-term changes in policy instruments such as pension policy. Moreover, information on
social contribution histories is not present in the underlying database. According to this, only
a partial simulation of social benet receipts that are contributory is possible. Further on,
EUROMOD does not incorporate the eects of behavioural changes.16
EUROMOD oers the possibility to simulate a policy swap, which means that parts of a
country's tax and benet system can be implemented in another country to simulate the results
of an introduction of the underlying policy. This allows to simulate dierent systems with Ger-
man data instead of just comparing the systems in the respective countries to see rst, what the
eects are for the German population, and second, what happens if just implementing another
country's nancing system without introducing its benet system.17 The simulated reform sce-
narios are not revenue-neutral. To establish revenue-neutral scenarios, some parameters would
16Cf. Sutherland (2001) for more information on EUROMOD.
17This approach was chosen to see the separate eects of dierent nancing systems. It has to be kept in
mind that the tax and transfer systems often interact in reality. Atkinson (1999) analyses the eects of transfer
programs on economic growth and employment.
10need to be changed in the original system, which would change the original structure of the
respective nancing system. Moreover, there are many possibilities to build a revenue-neutral
scenario, e.g. the tax rates could be changed or the tax base could be broadened. Therefore,
the nancing systems are left in their original structure for the simulation.
The disposable income of the simulated systems is compared using two dierent denitions.
The rst denition is the standard one of EUROMOD:
HH DisposableY = HH OriginalY   HH EESIC   HH Tax + HH Ben (1)
where HH DisposableY is disposable household income, HH OriginalY is the original house-
hold income, and HH EESIC are employee contributions, HH Tax taxes paid, and HH Ben
benets received by the household. The second denition additionally accounts for the employer
contributions of the dierent nancing systems as they are part of the labour costs:18
HH DisposableY (ERSIC) = LabourCosts   HH ERSIC   HH EESIC
 HH Tax + HH Ben (2)
where HH DisposableY (ERSIC) is disposable household income accounting for the employer
contributions HH ERSIC, and the values of LabourCosts are computed adding the original
employers contributions to the original income of the German system of 2003.
The average eective tax rate (AETR) measures the tax burden on total labour income as
a fraction of the tax base. For the calculation of the AETR, only employees in the working
age, i.e. between 16 and 64, are considered to compare the labour costs of the dierent systems
(Immervoll (2004)). Social insurance payments of employees and employers are included in the
tax burden. Thus, the computation of the AETRs is:
AETR = (EESIC + ERSIC + Taxes)=(TaxableY + ERSIC) (3)
where EESIC are employee contributions, ERSIC employer contributions, Taxes income
taxes paid by the individual, and TaxableY is taxable income. Hence, the AETR is a measure
for the tax and contribution wedge on total labour income. The AETR re
ects the participation
decision of a worker to enter the labour market (extensive margin).
The marginal eective tax rate (METR) serves as a measure of labour supply incentives for
the increase of work intensity along the intensive margin. It takes all benets, taxes and social
contributions into account that are paid by the individual. Benets are also included, because
18This exercise is done to account for changing employers SIC under the assumption that the labour costs
shall remain unchanged.
11they aect a person's current cash disposable income and are accounted for, when the person
decides to extent working hours. Similar to the computation of the AETRs, the METRs are
only computed for employees as follows:
METR = 1   (4DisposableY=4OriginalY ) (4)
where 4DisposableY is the change of disposable income, i.e. the change of post-tax-benet
income, and 4OriginalY is the margin by which the original income increases, which is chosen
here as an additional 3% of employment income (see Immervoll (2004)).
4 Simulating Dierent Financing Scenarios for Germany
The revenue of each simulated system (per month) is displayed in table 2. As explained above,
the simulated scenarios are not revenue-neutral, which needs to be kept in mind when inter-
preting the results of each scenario. The revenue of GE-2003 is much higher than the revenue
of the other systems. In DK-Sim, the tax revenue is the highest of all systems at 30.43 billion
e. The low level of the British revenue points out the residualism of the British welfare state
and the importance of private social insurance. Due to the low income thresholds of GR-Sim,
as explained in section 4.2.1, the level of the revenue components is distorted.
GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Revenue
Taxes 18,36 30,43 16,49 19,12
Employee Contributions 14,96 7,09 9,78 10,41
Employer Contributions 14,96 1,55 7,59 13,03
Total 48,28 39,07 33,86 42,56
Expenditure
Benefits 26,32 26,16 26,13 26,20
Table 2: National Budget, in billion e per month.
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD C13.
4.1 Eects on the Income Distribution
4.1.1 Implementing the Danish Financing System
Figure 3 presents the tax payments per decile for the baseline and the simulated systems. In
DK-Sim, the deciles ve to ten pay much higher taxes than in every other system. Due to the
high Danish tax rates, e.g. a top rate of 60.45%, a household pays 309 e more on average taxes
than in the baseline system GE-2003 and the highest decile even pays 927 e more per month.
12Also the lower income deciles pay higher taxes but the absolute growth of the tax payments
from the baseline to the simulated Danish system DK-Sim is especially high for the upper
deciles. On average, the taxes increase by 65.75%. The change of tax payments shows that
more redistribution takes place in the tax system of DK-Sim. These results can be ascribed
to the high tax rates applied to high and low income earners on the one hand, and to the low
tax-free amount of the Danish system, on the other hand. The tax-exempt amount is 4,487
e, compared to 7,235 e in the German system. The Danish tax rate of the lowest bracket is










GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Figure 3: Income Taxes per Decile
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD C13.
Considering the employee social contributions paid per decile completely changes the picture
(gure 4). The amount of contributions an average household has to pay in the baseline system
(383 e) is more than twice as high as in the Danish system (181 e). The low rate of the Danish
general contributions of 8% yields almost no contribution payments for the lower income deciles,
although there is no income threshold in DK-Sim, below which no contributions have to be paid.
Contrarily, in GE-2003, employees pay 21% of their employment income. In DK-Sim, almost
no employer contributions have to be paid, i.e. just 40 e on average, compared to 383 e in
GE-2003, which results from the very low rate of 2%, whereas in GE-2003 again 21% are levied.
The distribution of the disposable incomes in gures 5 and 6 shows that a lot of redistribution
takes place in DK-Sim: Despite the lower revenue generated in DK-Sim, the disposable income
of the upper deciles is comparatively low. Without accounting for the employer contributions,
it is even lower than in GE-2003 and in gure 6, it is just slightly above the disposable income
of GE-2003. Independent of the employer contributions, the disposable income of the lower













GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Figure 4: Employee Social Contributions per Decile
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD C13.
Greve (1996) argued that a welfare state nanced out of general taxation seems to have the
best possibility in achieving the goal of greater equity. This argument can be supported referring
to the Gini-coecient of the disposable income listed in tables 3 and 4, which is lower for the
Danish system compared to the baseline scenario. However, introducing the Danish nancing
system - without the corresponding benet system - leads to greater poverty. The German
benet system does not compensate (as much as the Danish one) for the higher taxation of
the lower income groups. The same argument holds for the high child poverty rate. Especially
families with low incomes are aected by the high rates of the lowest tax bracket and are not
compensated within the German benet system. The poverty rate of the elderly decreases from
15.8% in the baseline to 12% in table 3. This can be attributed to the exemption of pension
incomes in the Danish taxable income. In Denmark, just private pensions are part of the tax
base to increase the advantages of public social security. Contrarily, German pensioners have
to pay contributions for the public health and the statutory long-term care insurance.19
The implementation of the Danish instead of the German benet system would result in high
costs, which becomes obvious when considering the disposable income especially of the richer
households of the simulated Danish system. In 2001, an average Danish household receives
benets at a level of 874 e per month, which is far above the EU15 average of 630 e and the
19Accounting for the employer contributions and keeping the poverty line xed yields an even lower poverty
rate for the elderly and lower poverty rates for all simulated systems. This eect results from the higher
disposable income of the simulated systems, although they also realise smaller revenue. On the other hand,
adapting the poverty line to the higher disposable incomes overestimates the poverty rates, especially in DK-
Sim, where almost no employer contributions have to be paid. This increases the disposable incomes and thus









GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Figure 5: Disposable Income per Decile Without Accounting for Employer Contributions
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD C13.
highest level of all EU countries listed in these tables. Greve (1996) underlines that a universal
welfare state such as the Scandinavian model will have more diculties in the future due to
open borders, market competition and the resulting pressure put on high-tax-countries. Madsen
(1999) alludes to potentially resulting internal problems for the Danish welfare state that also
exist in other welfare states, but could be worse in Denmark due to the high tax burden, such
as tax evasion, tax resistance and incentives for the black economy. He also mentions that the
increased mobility of goods, services and factors of production could lead to scal pressure due
to the mobility of the tax base, and towards a harmonisation of tax rates across borders among
the EU countries.
To sum up, in DK-Sim, more redistribution takes place than in GE-2003, due to the impor-
tance of tax payments in the revenue structure. The upper deciles pay much more taxes, which
reduces inequality of incomes measured by the Gini-coecient. Contributions paid in DK-Sim
are comparatively low which reduces the redistributive eect.
4.1.2 Implementing the British Financing System
In UK-Sim, the rst four deciles pay almost no taxes as in GE-2003. For the fth and sixth
decile, tax payments are higher than in GE-2003, which is the other way around for the highest
deciles. These results can be ascribed to the more progressive tax schedule of GE-2003. The
taxes paid by an average household in UK-Sim are 48 e lower than in GE-2003. The composition
of the national budget of UK-Sim points out the relative importance of the taxes in the nancing
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Figure 6: Disposable Income per Decile Accounting for Employer Contributions
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD C13.
taxes is almost as high as in GE-2003.
The average employee contributions paid decrease by 35%. Referring to the much lower
contribution rates of 11% paid in UK-Sim in contrast to 21% in GE-2003, this result was
foreseeable. Contrarily to the contributions paid in GE-2003, the lowest four deciles almost pay
no contributions, due to the higher income threshold of 127.9 e per week which corresponds
to 548 e per month, below which no contributions are levied. This amount is always exempt
from contributions irrespective of a persons' income. In the German system, an income below
400 e a month is free of contributions, but on every income above this allowance, the 
at-rate
contributions are levied on every single e, which increases the payments of the poor.
Figure 4 shows that the relative increase of contribution payments of the upper ve deciles
is higher than in GE-2003. This increase can be attributed to the fact that the self-employed
in GE-2003 do not have to pay contributions, whereas in UK-Sim they have to, and many
self-employed are high income earners. The distribution of the employer contributions in UK-
Sim is quite similar, except that the increase of contributions paid by the upper deciles is not
as high as for the employee contributions, since there are no employers contributions for the
self-employed.
The disposable income in UK-Sim has risen in comparison to the baseline system and is
not much below the original income. The lower tax and contribution payments and the high
benets received by an average household give rise to a high disposable income. The residual
UK welfare state provides fewer benets on average than the German one and thus needs less
nancing. For the average British earner in 2003 the average benets were 564 e per month,
16compared to 673 e for the German 2003 system. The disposable income increases especially
with the upper deciles compared to GE-2003.
These increases in disposable income yield a higher Gini-coecient of UK-Sim (0.2779)
than of the baseline system GE-2003 (0.2682). Thus inequality has increased due to the British
nancing system. Similarly, poverty has augmented from 13 to 15.7% (or 16.2%, when accoun-
ting for employers contributions) of the population having an equivalised disposable income
of less than 60% of the median. Especially child poverty has increased from 15.5 to 20.6%.
These eects are due to the lower social contribution and tax payments made on average in
UK-Sim This results in higher disposable incomes and therefore a higher median and a higher
poverty threshold. However, these eects can also be attributed to the higher progressivity of
the nancing system of GE-2003.
Poverty (Headcount) GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Population 13,0% 13,9% 15,7% 15,3%
Children 15,5% 18,4% 20,6% 19,6%
Working Age (WA) 11,5% 13,1% 14,0% 13,5%
WA Econ. Act. 7,2% 9,6% 9,4% 8,9%
Elderly 15,8% 12,0% 16,3% 16,9%
Inequality (Gini) GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Original Income 0,4936 0,4936 0,4936 0,4936
Disposable income 0,2682 0,2496 0,2779 0,2816
Table 3: Poverty and Inequality of the Baseline and the Simulated Systems Without Accounting
for Employer Contributions
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD C13.
As mentioned in section 2, the Liberal welfare states just provide a residual public social
security. Their approach of social insurance is more market-based, and less income is distributed
from the rich to the poor by the public system. Thus, the introduction of a Liberal nancing
system increases inequality and poverty.
4.1.3 Implementing the Greek Financing System
The quantity of welfare provided by the Greek system is low compared to other European coun-
tries. Just considering the nancial part of the welfare system and keeping the German benets
thus results in a high disposable income that is close to the baseline income. Surprisingly, the
tax payments in the simulated Greek system are even slightly higher, and they are almost
similarly distributed among the deciles as those of GE-2003. Referring to the comparatively
low tax payments of the original Greek system of 2003 this outcome was not predictable. Only
the tenth decile pays lower taxes because of the higher top rate in GE-2003.
17Poverty (Headcount), 
Fixed Poverty Line
GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Population 13,0% 11,1% 9,8% 14,3%
Children 15,5% 14,2% 12,8% 19,4%
Working Age (WA) 11,5% 10,3% 8,7% 13,4%
Elderly 15,8% 10,8% 10,4% 12,0%
Poverty (Headcount), 
Adapted Poverty Line
GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Population 13,0% 16,4% 16,2% 16,5%
Children 15,5% 20,9% 21,1% 22,2%
Working Age (WA) 11,5% 14,9% 14,1% 15,3%
Elderly 15,8% 16,9% 18,2% 14,6%
Inequality (Gini) GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Original Income 0,4936 0,4936 0,4936 0,4936
Disposable income 0,2682 0,2600 0,2711 0,2884
Table 4: Poverty and Inequality of the Baseline and the Simulated Systems Accounting for
Employer Contributions
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD C13.
The simulation of the Greek nancing system, based on German data, changes the structure
of the system completely. Average social contribution payments in the original Greek system
of 2003 are much higher (207 e) than the average tax payments (147 e). Due to the German
population, average contributions of 274 e are higher in GR-Sim, but lower than the average
tax payment of 486 e. One minor reason for the high tax payments might be the inclusion of
pension in the Greek tax base, but the major reason is the lower standard of living in Greece.
The tax schedule, being adjusted to the lower level of wages in Greece, sorts more households
into the upper tax brackets, when realised on the basis of German data. The opposite distortions
as to the tax schedule apply to the social contribution schedule.
The social contributions of the Greek nancing system, implemented in Germany, are com-
paratively low, which can be ascribed to three causes: First, the employee contribution rate
of GR-Sim is lower than the German one. A Greek employee has to pay 16% plus 3.45% for
hazardous workers. These are blue collar workers in certain occupations which are less repre-
sented in the German than in the Greek database. Therefore, in GR-Sim, more people just
pay the 16% than in GR-2003, in which 40% of the employees contribute 19.45%. Second,
the income ceiling for the assessment of contributions in GR-Sim is far below the ceiling in
GE-2003, i.e. 1,960.25 e in GR-Sim, and 3,450 e in Germany for the health insurance, and
even 3,850 e Eastern German and 4,600 e Western German income ceiling for the pension and
disability insurance. Due to the lower market incomes of the Greek population, less burden is
loaded on the Greek population. In particular the Greek social contribution schedule is adap-
ted to the lower economic status of the population. In GE-2003, the average market income
18is much higher. Thus, the richer households now have to pay less contributions and only on
income up to the lower ceiling.20 Third, contributions paid by the self-employed in GR-Sim are
comparatively high and the number of self-employed and farmers in the German population
is low compared to the Greek one. There are 1,916 self-employed in the Greek database and
514 in the German one. The distribution of the employee contribution payments is quite simi-
lar to the distribution of GE-2003. The increase of contribution for the upper deciles is just
slightly lower due to the lower income ceiling in the GR-Sim. Considering the distribution of
the employer contributions, unlike in GE-2003, no contributions are paid by the lower deciles.
The employer contributions paid in the GE-2003 are those for the health insurance paid by the
pension fund. The distribution of the employer contributions in the upper deciles in GR-Sim
has a more concave trend because of the lower income ceiling and the higher contribution rate
of 28% plus 3.15% for hazardous workers compared to 21% in GE-2003.
The Gini-coecient in the simulated Greek system is the highest of all four systems. Regar-
ding the change of disposable income from GE-2003 to GR-Sim, gives the explanation. In terms
of disposable income, the lower income earners are the losers and the upper income earners the
winners. Therefore, the richer households save more money now, which is mainly due to the
lower rate and lower income ceiling for the contribution payments. Less redistribution takes
place which yields to higher inequality.
Table 4 shows an increase of the overall poverty from 13 to 16.5 %. The same explanations
as for the growth of inequality are valid to explain this result. In addition, due to the higher
disposable incomes, the poverty threshold has risen, which also explains the higher tax amount
paid by the poor. Especially the poverty rate of the elderly has grown which results from the
dierent tax base. In Germany, only civil servants' pensions are part of the taxable income,
whereas the Greek system levies taxes on all pensions.
Regarding the shares of social contributions and taxes paid per decile in each system, as
presented in gure 7, shows that there are some tendencies concerning the distribution of
shares according to whether a system relies more on taxes or social contributions. The shares
of the Bismarckian systems of GE-2003 and GR-Sim are comparatively higher for the lower
deciles and lower for the upper deciles. This could lead to the conclusion that concerning the
nancing structure, Beveridgean systems such as DK-Sim and UK-Sim have more potential to
redistribute. However, because of the low tax and contribution rates, and the lower revenue
generated, inequality increases in UK-Sim.
20It could be considered as a drawback that the structure of the Greek nancing system has not been adopted
to German standards, but this has not been done on purpose. As mentioned in previous sections, the Southern
countries feature a nancing structure that is close to the structure of the conservative countries, but they
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Figure 7: Share of Social Contributions and Taxes Paid per Decile
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD C13.
4.2 Eects on Labour Costs and on Labour Supply Incentives
After having analysed the distributional eects of the three simulated reform scenarios, the
eects on labour costs measured by the AETRs and on intensive labour supply incentives in
terms of the METRs are evaluated for the simulated nancing systems.21 The evaluation of the
eective tax rates will mainly focus on the median rates since they are less sensitive to extreme
values. Similar to the analysis above, the results of the simulated systems are compared to
the baseline system GE-2003. For the interpretation of the AETRs and METRs later on, it
should be kept in mind that they result from simulated systems, which are combinations of the
German benet system and the nancing systems of the respective countries, and cannot be
compared to the rates of the real systems.
4.2.1 AETRs and METRs of the Danish Financing System
The overall median AETR of DK-Sim is by eleven percentage points lower than the one of GE-
2003, although the tax payments of the Danish system are signicantly higher, as displayed
in gure 3. The high level of the average German AETR can be attributed to the higher
contributions paid by the employees and the employers in Germany, which imposes higher
costs on labour than the Danish income tax just paid by the employees. The dierence of
the median AETRs of the two systems is much bigger for the lower than for the upper income
21One should note that there will always be behavioural reactions when introducing new taxes, or elevating,
or lowering, existing ones. These reactions should not be underestimated and it has to be kept in mind that
they are not covered by EUROMOD.
20deciles. For the rst two deciles, the AETRs of GE-2003 are three times higher than the Danish
ones. This result supports the point of view that especially low income receivers are charged by
the high tax and contribution wedge in Germany (see, e.g., Sinn (2005)). It can be concluded
that DK-Sim imposes lower labour costs on lower income workers and increases their incentive
to participate in the labour market. Due to the high top income tax rate of DK-Sim, the
median AETR of the last decile is higher than in GE-2003. Since in DK-Sim, a lower revenue
is realised, it can be assumed that the AETRs would be higher in general when considering a
revenue-neutral reform scenario.
GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
0,52 0,41 0,33 0,39
GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
0,47 0,46 0,38 0,40
Overall Median METR
Overall Median AETR
Table 5: Overall Median Eective Tax Rates
Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD.
Regarding the intensive labour supply incentives in terms of the METRs changes the picture
somewhat. The overall median METR of DK-Sim (0.46) is almost the same as the METR of
GE-2003 (0.47). Taking a closer look at the distribution along the deciles reveals that the
deciles nine and ten of DK-Sim are confronted with much higher METRs, i.e. 0.65, than the
respective deciles of GE-2003 (0.49 and 0.47). Consequently, an additional hour of work leaves
an high-income employee in DK-Sim with less additional disposable income than in GE-2003.
This results from the fact that the Danish nancing system mainly relies on income taxation,
whereas in the German system social contributions play a major role. In DK-Sim, high-income
earners have to pay additional taxes on the marginal increase of their wage. Contrarily, social
insurances in GE-2003 are only paid up to an income ceiling and thus have a regressive schedule.
The rst two deciles are also aected by an increase of the METRs due to the high tax rate
of 39.45% of the lowest tax bracket of DK-Sim. To sum up, the nancing system DK-Sim,
relying more on income taxation, increases (decreases) the extensive (intensive) labour supply
incentives.
4.2.2 AETRs and METRs of the British Financing System
The simulation of the British nancing system yields the lowest overall median AETRs and
METRs. Due to the low social contribution payments and the low tax payments of the em-









GE-2003 DK-Sim. UK-Sim. GR-Sim.
Figure 8: Median Average Eective Tax Rates per Decile
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD C13.
level compared to the other systems. As a result of the high tax-exempt income and the relati-
vely high contribution-free amount, labour costs are especially low for the low-income earners.
For the same reason, the intensive labour supply incentives are very high for the lowest two
deciles. The AETRs increase slightly with the higher deciles. The median METRs vary a bit
between the dierent deciles but remain almost on the average level of 38%. Thus, the incen-
tives for an employee to augment hours of working are almost the same for every income earner.
Consequently, the decision to work more is not distorted between dierent wage levels. The
intensive labour supply incentives are especially high for the rst two deciles and slightly lower
for the last decile compared to the constant level of the METRs of the deciles four to nine.
4.2.3 AETRs and METRs of the Greek Financing System
On the basis of the higher wage level in the German population, the relation of tax and contri-
bution payments in GR-Sim has distorted the structure of the original Greek nancing system.
This leads to AETRs and METRs that are just partially comparable with the eective tax
rates of those that would result from the original Greek system. The comparatively low level
of AETRs mainly results from the lower level of nancing that takes place in GR-Sim. Despite
these drawbacks, it is interesting to see how a drastic reduction of social contribution payments
aects the labour costs. The structural distribution of the AETRs of GR-Sim is similar to the
AETRs of GE-2003, but on a lower level. Only the deciles two and three show larger dierences
between the labour costs because of the lower tax-exempt amount of GE-2003 and the higher
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Figure 9: Median Marginal Eective Tax Rates per Decile
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD C13.
The intensive labour supply incentives do not change for the rst three deciles because of
the high tax-exempt income amount of GR-Sim, which explains the large step between decile
three and four. The following deciles are also confronted with additional tax payments when
extending working hours. Compared to GE-2003, the rst decile of GR-Sim is confronted with
a higher METR and thus fewer incentives to work more, which results from the fact that in
GR-Sim social insurance contributions have to be paid already on the rst Euro earned.
To sum up, the labour costs in terms of the AETRs in the original German system are
the highest on average, and they are especially high for the lower income deciles. A reduction
of social contribution payments yields lower labour costs, in particular for the lower income
earners. A high level of income taxation as in DK-Sim reduces overall labour costs on the one
hand, but increases the METRs for the lower and upper deciles. The simulated Liberal British
nancing system displays the lowest labour costs and gives the highest incentives to labour
supply to increase working hours, but it also generates the lowest revenue of all the simulated
systems. Concerning the distribution of the AETRs, their level is lower for the lower deciles in
a nancing system relying more on income taxation, i.e. DK-Sim and UK-Sim, and it increases
more for the upper deciles than in the Bismarckian systems GE-2003 and GR-Sim. Regarding
the distribution of the METRs, there seems to be a tendency that the Beveridgean systems
DK-Sim and UK-Sim provide comparatively low rates for the lower income deciles but higher
rates for the upper deciles. However, considering the Danish case, for which the METRs of the
lower deciles are elevated, this eect also depends strongly on the tax-exempt amount and the
lowest tax rate.
235 Policy conclusions
The aim of this paper was to analyse dierent nancing systems for Germany. When inter-
preting the results, several qualications have to be taken into account: First, the simulated
reform scenarios are not revenue-neutral. Second, the benet side of the welfare state, which
might enhance or dampen these eects, has been kept unchanged. Third, the simulated sys-
tems do not account for behavioural reactions of the economic agents, such as tax evasion, and
for adjustment processes. Fourth, tax competition could put pressure on the level of income
taxes. Fifth, interactions with business taxation are not considered. Despite these constraints
the following policy conclusions can be drawn:
The introduction of the Social-democratic Danish nancing system decreases inequality of
incomes, but does not necessarily lead to less poverty. Tax payments are extremely high,
whereas social contribution payments are relatively low. As a result, the distribution of the
household disposable income shows comparatively high levels for the lower deciles and low
levels for the upper deciles. These results demonstrate the strong redistributive eects of the
Danish nancing structure. The labour costs measured in terms of AETRs decrease, especially
for low-income earners, but are higher for the highest decile. Contrarily, the intensive labour
supply incentives, displayed by the high level of the METRs, decrease for low and high-income
earners.
The introduction of a Liberal British nancing system reduces equality and increases po-
verty. The revenue generated by this system is the lowest of all simulated systems. Since the
Liberal welfare states heavily rely on private insurance, social contributions are comparatively
low. The extensive labour supply incentives are high on average (low AETRs) and especially
for the lower deciles. The intensive labour supply incentives are almost constant and on a
comparatively high level, except for the rst two deciles where they are extremely high, and
for the last decile, where they are slightly lower (higher METR).
The introduction of the Southern Greek system yields higher inequality and poverty due
to the low income thresholds, which lead to higher disposable incomes of the rich and lower
disposable incomes of the poor. The average extensive and intensive labour supply incentives
are higher for the simulated Greek system than for the original German one, which can be
ascribed to the lower revenue generated by the Greek nancing system. The distributional
structure of the eective tax rates along the deciles shows similarities to the original German
system just on lower levels.
In general, some tendencies can be seen, which result from the existing nancing structure:
The share of contribution and tax payments is higher for the upper decile groups and lower for
the rst deciles in the systems relying more on income taxation, i.e. the Danish and British
Beveridgean systems, in comparison to the Bismarckian nancing systems of Germany and
24Greece. Thus, they have a higher potential to redistribute, but, as it can be seen in the case
of the British nancing system, the level of redistribution also depends strongly on the level of
payments. Concerning the distribution of the AETRs, their level is higher for the lower deciles
in the Bismarckian systems, and it increases less for the upper deciles than in the Beveridgean
systems. According to this, fewer extensive labour supply incentives for the lower income groups
prevail in the Conservative and Southern nancing systems. Regarding the distribution of the
METRs, there seems to be a tendency that the Beveridgean systems provide comparatively
high rates for the upper deciles compared to the Bismarckian systems. Due to the fact that
tax schedules are progressive and social contribution schedules are linear or even regressive,
changing a nancing system towards more income taxation increases the extra payments of the
richest of the population for an additional hour of work.
To sum up, our simulation results suggest that Conservative welfare states are quite suc-
cessful with respect to the levels of welfare and inequality as well as poverty. But regarding
labour costs and labour supply incentives, the structures of the nancing systems have decits.
Especially the regressive design of the German social insurance contributions scheme in com-
bination with a rather generous social assistance scheme reduces the participation incentives
for low wage earners. In the end, the existing system has the same impacts like an additional
tax on labour. The resulting high unemployment of especially low skilled workers remains one
of the main challenges for German policy makers. To overcome these problems, reforms are
needed, not only on the nancing, but also on the benet side of the welfare state (see, e.g.,
Zimmermann et al. (2008)). When looking at Germany's neighbours in Europe, our analysis
identies two main issues: First, as an important step towards a more viable nancing struc-
ture, social insurances must be relieved from redistributive tasks. This is a lesson to be learned
from our Nordic neighbours with their Social-democratic welfare state regimes. Benets not
related to insured risks ought to be nanced primarily through taxes. Redistributive tasks
should be handled through direct transfers. This allows to reduce the marginal contribution
rate and increase work incentives. Further on, the contribution base should be extended to
other income sources besides labour as well. Second, to further promote the employment of
low-skilled workers, workfare principles, i.e. government benets are tied to the participation
in work or vocational training programs - like in the Anglo-Saxon Liberal welfare state regimes
- should be implemented in social security. These reform steps increase work incentives for low-
skilled workers and put the nancing of social security on a solid ground as they turn benet
recipients into tax and contribution payers.
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